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ABSTRACT
On the 23rdMarch 2020, the UK entered a period of lockdown
in the face of a deadly pandemic. While some were unable to
work from home, many organisations were forced to move
their activities online. Here, we discuss the technologies
they used, from a privacy and security perspective. We also
mention the communication failures that have exacerbated
uncertainty and anxiety during the crisis.
An organisation could be driven to move their activities
online by a range of disasters, of which a global pandemic
is only one. We seek, in this paper, to highlight the need
for organisations to have contingency plans in place for this
kind of eventuality.
The insecure usages and poor communications we high-
light are a symptom of a lack of advance pre-pandemic plan-
ning. We hope that this paper will help organisations to plan
more effectively for the future.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The pandemic of 2020 led countries to impose lockdowns,
which closed schools, universities and a host of other work-
places. This forced organisations to move their activities
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online, and employees were often left to find the best tech-
nologies to carry out their core activities. Many grasped at
the most familiar or popular technologies to satisfy their
needs. In some cases, the technologies they used, or the way
they used them, exposed them to the actions of hackers, or
violated their privacy. We explore these issues in Section 3.
On the other hand, the 2018 GDPR regulation made or-
ganisations consider and manage the way they stored per-
sonal and sensitive data. The fact that organisations had
gone through this process stood them in good stead when
the lockdown was imposed. This demonstrates the immense
value of planning and putting measures in place. We discuss
secure measures in Section 2.
There were also some worrying developments, in terms
of privacy and human rights violations. We discuss these in
Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5, we present guidelines for measures or-
ganisations could implement to prepare for future lockdowns.
These will minimise the security and privacy violations that
are occurring during the current lockdown, as revealed by
our narratives. Section 6 concludes. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the paper.
Figure 1: Narratives Explored in this Paper
The research methodology used in this paper is desk re-
search. In other words, we gathered facts and news reports
that helped us to construct the emergent security and privacy
focused narrative around the UK’s 2020 pandemic lockdown.
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By so doing, we have been able to highlight the need for
organisations to support their employees more effectively so
that they can achieve private and secure at-home working.
Bill Gates predicts that pandemics will occur every 20 years
[15], and other disasters, such as fires, occur unpredictably
and also send workers home.A lockdown could happen again.
We thus build on the research literature to propose guide-
lines for working securely and privately at home, as our main
contribution.
2 THE SECURE
As academics, we are in a good position to write about the
plans our Universities made before the introduction of GDPR
in 2018. Universities across Europe engaged in activities to
ensure that their employees knew exactly how to secure
their data.
Our institutions implemented measures that are likely to
be typical of the industry at large. They published policies
and provided secure storage in some cases. Whatever their
individual arrangements, this preparation for GDPR meant
they were well prepared for the lockdown, when it came to
data storage.
A brief review of the authors’ institutions’ policies evi-
dences this. One author’s institution has a GDPR policy that
lays down “good practice” principles for storing and manag-
ing research data. Guidance is also provided with respect to
where data should be stored (i.e. on University sanctioned
storage drives). Another author’s institution’s information
security policy devotes two pages to explaining how research
data ought to be secured. A third author’s institution has a
five page Data Protection Policy laying out guidelines for
securing data. A fourth author’s institution publishes an
9-page policy to guide data protection activities.
One policy specifies that OneDrive be used to store data,
but the others do not do this. Two forbid the use of Dropbox
for research data.
As well as policies that address GDPR needs, there is also
a need to consider the security of the architecture that en-
ables home working. For example, considering Wifi routers:
whether or not these are password-protected and the age of
the routers is relevant (more recent routers have more in-
built security). Moreover, others in the household may have
access to the computers used for remote working and the
separation of work and personal technology usage becomes
challenging.
In none of the policies we reviewed was video conferenc-
ing software mentioned. Nor were any recommendations
made about protocols for home working or secure software
to use, nor were there any guidelines for hardware config-
urations that would help improve home working security.
Finally, there was no mention of the use of VPNs to preserve
privacy.
3 THE INSECURE
3.1 Video Conferencing Technologies
The move to home working, and the use of online conferenc-
ing software, has increased exponentially [41] as society em-
braces social distancing and heeds isolation instructions from
the government. Quarantined employees naturally sought
a way to stay in touch with their loved ones, and maintain
relationships with colleagues, whilst also conducting their
work activities from home.
There are a range of tools on that enable colleagues and
collaborators to work together in a virtual “face to face” envi-
ronment whilst maintaining social distancing. Many turned
to Google to find the tools they needed. Figures 2 and 3 depict
the spike in searches for video conferencing technologies
since the beginning of the lockdown. As these graphs demon-
strate, many found Zoom and looked for more information.
Figure 2: Google Searches for “Video Conferencing”
from 10 March 2020 to 10 April 2020
Figure 3: Searches for Zoom, Teams and Skype from
10 March 2020 to 10 April 2020
The rush to adopt video conferencing technologies ush-
ered in a number of interesting and concerning aspects, in
terms of user behaviour.
3.1.1 No Guidelines.
Because of the speed in implementing video conferencing
technologies, very few organisations had the time to put poli-
cies or protocols in place regarding remote working practices.
This means employees are figuring out their practices for
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themselves. They might be well informed, and do so securely,
but they might also put themselves and their employers’ de-
vices at risk.
3.1.2 Unwise Installation.
One the one hand, there is a need to be included and to
ensure that users have the appropriate hardware to enable
the software to be utilised. Users may have been given ad-
min rights to enable them to install software because their
corporate IT support do not have the capacity to support a
multitude of users trying to install software. This may lead
to advised checking and testing not being completed. It also
potentially causes stress when things do not work or users
cannot connect to the technology that their peers are using.
On the other hand, the need to connect with others can
lead to unwise installation of technologies and this may
mean that the usual security checks are not in place. The
adoption of workable solutions in the short term could well
obscure underlying problems, for example with user privacy,
data and information sharing, and possible unwitting GDPR
violations.
Furthermore, once the pandemic period is over, the extent
of privacy, security and data protection violations will be
discovered. The subsequent fall-out in terms of managing
the administration of both criminal and civil regulations,
could prove to be overwhelming to institutions, regulators
and individuals, if the use of these emergency tools can be
shown to have been used uncritically and without informed
consent or sufficient care for personal data.
3.1.3 Zoom.
This particular tool has become very popular. As its pop-
ularity has risen, so have concerns about its security and
potential privacy violating practices [27]. A number of se-
curity experts have raised concerns about vulnerabilities
within Zoom [36, 72]
• Potential privacy violations. Research by Citizen Lab
found that cryptographic operations were delivered to partici-
pants via servers in China [39, 40].
• “Zoomboming”. This is where trolls take advantage of
open or unprotected meetings and poor default configura-
tions to broadcast porn or other explicit material. In response,
Zoom enabled the Waiting Room feature which allows a
meeting host to control when a participant joins the meet-
ing and enforces passwords. On the 8th April researchers
revealed a security vulnerability in the waiting room [44].
• Security vulnerabilities. Researchers discovered a flaw
in Zoom’s Windows application which allowed remote at-
tackers to steal victims’ Windows login credentials and execute
arbitrary commands on their systems. A patch was issued on
April 2, 2020, to address this flaw. Other researchers created
a new tool called “zWarDial” that searches for open Zoom
meeting IDs, finding around 100 meetings per hour that aren’t
protected by any password. There is also evidence that Zoom
IDs and passwords are being sold on the dark web [7].
As we write, some countries [59] have suspended the use
of Zoom by teachers due to abuse by hackers. Zoom has been
particularly responsive to these criticisms, patching them as
quickly as they can [51]. However, as Mudge [51] points out,
whilst the Zoom developers should have addressed security
issues in the initial design, 5 years ago, they are trying to “fix”
vulnerabilities as the Zoom user community grows. Mudge
also indicates that there is a responsibility on the user to
ensure security of any application that they are using, in-
cluding Zoom. Making sure that routers are robust (and up
to date), making sure tools are up to date and ensuring the
patches and updates are put in place as soon as they become
available will all contribute to safer Video Conferencing en-
vironments. The Zoom developers will also see this as an
opportunity to improve their product.
The Zoom scenario seems to be a classic trade off between
usability and security, highlighted by Cranor and Garfinkel
[14]. The rush to ensure that colleagues could stay connected,
at very short notice meant that easy to install and use applica-
tions, such as Zoom, are being used without people thinking
about security or even knowing what steps to take to assure
secure usage.
3.1.4 In Conclusion.
We have discussed Zoom, which has attracted a great deal
of attention due to its escalating user numbers. It is likely
that many of the other video conferencing offerings also
have vulnerabilities which are, even now, being exploited by
hackers.
Our argument is not Zoom-specific. We are making the
point that many are using a variety of video conferencing
technologies with serious vulnerabilities, and they are doing
so because they either do not have any alternatives, because
they feel impelled by the critical mass usage to use them, or
because they are simply unaware of the vulnerabilities.
3.2 School Teachers
School teachers are perhaps most unprepared to move their
activities online. The bulk of their work is face to face with
the children, in and out of classrooms. Now suddenly they
have had to find other ways to engage. There is some evi-
dence that they are woefully uninformed about privacy [2]
and security [58].
The advice from Human Rights Watch [46] is to focus on
the most accessible technologies and methods. There is no
mention of privacy or security considerations in this article.
Yet privacy, too, is a human right (United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, Article 12) and in Europe the
new GDPR regulations have stringent rules requiring that
children’s data be kept private [45]. We now provide two
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examples of teachers maximising accessibility with security
and privacy pitfalls.
3.2.1 Example: Gym Teachers.
Gym teachers would like their pupils to provide evidence
that they are doing their exercises. How do they do this while
all their pupils are quarantined?
Anonymous [2] posted a comment to a Reddit group, say-
ing that a teacher wanted children to post videos to YouTube.
The first comment is from a teacher, defending the practice:
“I think the mindset is trying to prevent students from just
faking it by having them show evidence, but an email to the
teacher asking for an alternative assignment should work.”
Another teacher explains: “My district wants me to document
everything I am doing daily that is focused on my degree. 3 to
5 hours a day M-F. How the hell can I come up with 3 to 5 hrs
of stuff 5 days a week?! We have to document it and turn in a
log sheet every Monday.”
One commenter doesn’t understand what the fuss is about:
“Maybe not social media but why not? Meet them where they
are at and remove barriers.”
Some suggest alternatives: “I friend of mine made a private
Facebook group for his classes and that’s how they’re going ev-
erything.” However, Facebook and privacy are diametrically
opposed [1].
Another offered advice: “YouTube videos can be private -
accessed only with a link. If this must happen, that could be
an option - then delete the video after the grade is marked.”
The question that has to be asked, in this case, is how the
password will be communicated to the teacher? If email is
used, the YouTube video is not private.
Others express more concerns about privacy violations:
“Nothing is truly private on the internet and there are a bunch
of bored perverts home with nothing else to do.”
The upshot is that children’s privacy is being lost.
Don’t Blame the Teachers
One of the final comments expresses the unreadiness of this
demographic. “Teachers are working their asses off to put a
plan in motion that hasn’t even been finished yet. The nation,
state and district haven’t planned ahead for this, it’s all being
crafted on the spot and teachers are the ones doing the brunt
of the work to make sure your nephew, niece, child, loved one
is still being educated, still given a routine, still knows they
have someone checking in on them and supporting them. Get
off your reddit high horse and thank a [snip] teacher who has
been sourcing every ounce of “creativity” to meet the demands
of the education system with minimal support and with educ.”
Certainly, many parents are expressing their support for the
huge efforts teachers are making [18].
We are not blaming teachers; we are pointing the finger
at those who are responsible for providing teachers with the
technologies they need to carry out their activities during
the pandemic. Based on the evidence we have gathered, it
certainly seems as if they have been left to find their own
way. That they make mistakes when their employers fail to
support them is understandable.
3.2.2 Example: Higher Education.
Higher education institutions have also been forced to pro-
vide teaching, resources and support activities online. The
concerns about privacy, data protection, verification, collu-
sion, cheating, and how to conduct online assessment, are
similar to those experienced by school teachers. Higher ed-
ucation institutions however, have access to vastly more
resources than schools, including an existing distance learn-
ing infrastructure, and a relatively high proportion of staff
able to work from home.
In responding to the crisis, Universities offered access to
multiple online tools, often without due diligence of privacy
and security issues, or guidance for staff. There did not seem
to be time to think about this in the rush to go online, with the
focus being on delivery, staff/student support and promoting
key public health advice [66].
Whilst this is understandable, the lack of oversight may
result in significant problems in the future, as video confer-
encing apps, and an eclectic mix of online tools are used
without a second thought (the Zoom app is integrated into
Microsoft teams [47]). The result is that confidential discus-
sions are open to interception, student workmay be accessed,
exams compromised and sensitive data inadvertently leaked.
However, there is some awareness of the issues, and aca-
demic institutions worldwide are working to understand and
make sense of this new way of working [42]. Meanwhile, the
technology companies are under pressure to address con-
cerns and to secure their systems [33], but it is likely to be
too little, too late.
4 THEWORRYING
4.1 Contact-tracing Apps
Governments are doing everything they can to prevent deaths
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some governments have
used contact tracing tools, either by mobile phone apps or
using cell tower triangulation [35, 56, 63, 68]. These can trace
all the people an infected person has been in contact with to
provide warning of possible infection. Contact tracing is a
mature technique, which has been used to track tuberculosis
[54], SARS [26] or STDs [5] contacts.
Yet these apps, even if initially justified during the pan-
demic, can very quickly violate privacy and other human
rights after the pandemic has abated [11]. Some countries
have used contact tracing in an authoritarian and privacy
violating fashion [9, 37, 73].
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An Israeli company has published an app [12] which
claims to respect the privacy of citizens, as follows (direct
quote from Cluley):
• Use of the app is optional, not compulsory. Any location
data collected by the app does not leave the phone, and is not
uploaded to the Israeli government. All processing happens
on the phone itself.
• Those diagnosed with Coronavirus have to volunteer
their location history for use by the app, which is driven by
a JSON file that is updated with new data on an hourly basis.
• Even if a match is made, the app does not inform the
Israeli Ministry of Health. It’s up to the user to get in touch
if the app alerts that there might have been an encounter
with a Coronavirus case.
• To reassure users about the behaviour of the app, it
has been released as open source and its code published on
Github.
• The app’s code has been examined by security experts
at Profero.
All of these efforts, and the motivation to use an app, are
based on the assumption that infection can only occur within
6 feet of an infected person. Yet MIT recently published re-
search that showed that the droplets from a cough or sneeze
could travel up to 27 feet [16].
The immediate justifications for extending surveillance of
the public, uses the rhetoric of war to ‘battle the virus’ and to
reinforce its citizen’s sense that ‘we are all in this together’
[64]. but the expectation that all good citizens should be
happy to utilise the app, and therefore give up some of their
liberties for the benefit of society [25]. This then helps to
create a moral imperative to comply with requests for quite
draconian restrictions on civil liberties. By using ‘nudge’
tactics [52], they attempt to habituate the population into
acceptance of increased electronic surveillance. This means
that those not engaging can be presented as having a moral
failing or a lack of civic awareness. In terms of the ‘battle’
against COVID-19, the expectation is that everyone will do
Figure 4: Google Searches for Surveillance vs. Contact
Tracing from 10 March 2020 to 10 April 2020
their utmost to prevent its spread, and dire warnings, accom-
panied by daily death rates, will serve to sustain pressure to
submit to increased surveillance. Social shaming regarding
the lock-down conditions is already evident, encouraged and
actively promoted by the media [32]. Social media is fur-
ther increasing the pressure, and includes trolling, and other
forms of online abuse, aimed at those perceived to question
government requests.
This approach is not dissimilar to an oft-repeated state-
ment used to shut down concerns about the use of surveil-
lance, particularly post 9/11: “if you’ve got nothing to hide,
you’ve got nothing to fear” [61]. The message here is that
surveillance that enhances national security and protects
against terrorism should take precedence over personal lib-
erty. It can be surmised that it is only a matter of time before
such rhetoric is resurgent in the public dialogue. In a crisis,
most people are eager to help their fellow citizens [70] and
compliance with rules is consistent with this stance. How-
ever, a few dissenting voices are expressing concerns about
the potential future use of these technologies [53].
The acceptance of increased surveillance may not be en-
couraged just through the impact of a global emergency,
social shaming and nudge tactics. In many countries, both
authoritarian and democratic, people have become habit-
uated to living under surveillance via CCTV, GPS, Smart
Phones and during Internet usage, whether that is by the
government [21, 69] or by businesses [74]. Many have be-
come so accustomed to being under surveillance, that the
Panopticon, a prison system of total surveillance and a ‘new
mode of obtaining power of mind over mind’ devised by
Jeremy Bentham [6] has become the reality of our modern,
surveillance society [28, 43].
As the current situation begins to resolve, questions about
an end to the increased surveillance will be raised. It is likely
that arguments will then bemade to retain these technologies
in the fight against crime or terrorism and above all, to ensure
that “We are ready next time". In response, parliaments have
an important role to hold the government to account. The UK
Labour opposition leader has stated that he will scrutinise
the UK government’s actions and point out any failures that
need to be addressed [4]. However, the key to the success or
failure of current and future responses to such a crisis lies in
how and what information is communicated to the public.
4.2 Ineffective Communication
4.2.1 Government Communication to the Police.
The UK government passed coronavirus legislation, which
gave police new powers [65]. Very soon after the country
was put into lockdown, reports of police men and women
exceeding their remit began to emerge.
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For example, Derbyshire Police used drones to film people
walking in the hills, on their own, to name and shame them
online [19] and dyed the local pool black so that people
would not want to take a swim [49]. This police force is not
the only one to overstep the mark.
Warrington police posted to Twitter that ‘six people had
been summonsed for offences relating to the new coronavirus
legislation to protect the public’ [71]. The violations include
going ‘out for a drive due to boredom’ and ‘multiple people
from the same household going to the shops for non-essential
items’. The legislation does not specify what essential items
are, so the police are clearly deciding for themselves. For
example, a news report on the 30th March reported that
police had ruled Easter eggs “non-essential” [23] (in the week
before Easter). Wine and crisps too, were ruled non-essential
[50]. Given that the government requires that citizens do
not do non-essential shopping, would it be the shops that
are responsible to ensure that non-essential items are not
offered for sale?
Slater [60] argues that: “The thing is when you give police
– or in the case of these new regulations, police, community
support officers and other people ‘designated’ by local author-
ities – the power and moral authority to throw their weight
around, many of them are bound to overinterpret their respon-
sibilities and overstep the mark. ” This sentiment is echoed
by Campbell [10].
Indeed, police chiefs have now become concerned enough
to issue a statement saying they will be drawing up new
guidelines so that their police forces [48] do not overreach
their authority. This was in response to former Supreme
Court Justice Lord Sumption saying that Britain risked turn-
ing into a “police state” [55]. The Home Secretary Priti Patel
was moved by comments issued by Northamptonshire Police
Chief Constable Nick Adderley to issue a warning to police
on the 10th April saying that road blocks and checking of
supermarket trolleys were “not appropriate” [62].
We believe many of these issues can be traced back to
poor communication from the UK government about what
actions the police should be taking. In the absence of clarity,
some people will naturally overreach, as indeed they have.
4.2.2 Government Communication to Citizens.
Grater [30] reports on Emily Maitlis calling the UK govern-
ment’s language ‘trite’ and ‘misleading’, when they were
discussing the COVID-19 virus. She said that UK Cabinet
member Dominic Raab erroneously suggested that people
could survive the illness through fortitude and strength of
character. She also pointed out that the virus and the lock-
down was much harder on the poor, than on the wealthy.
During the week of the 6th April 2020, every household
in the United Kingdom received a letter from the Prime
Minister.
With the letter was a leaflet which included the diagram
in Figure 5. This graph was rather puzzling and seemed
inaccurate since the letter came from the Prime Minister,
who himself had just been admitted to hospital 10 days after
falling ill with the virus. This diagram conflicts with the text
in the leaflet, which suggests that Person C should isolate
for an extra 7 days, now that Person D has started exhibiting
symptoms.
From the very beginning, when the coronavirus emerged
in Wuhan, the one consistent message has been to wash
hands. On the other hand, the communication around face
masks has been confusing and inconsistent. The Google
Trends graph in Figure 6 demonstrates the uncertainty around
face masks, as evidenced by increased numbers of Google
searches. People were initially told that face masks were
ineffective [34]. Then, on the 1st April, the World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO) announced that it was considering chang-
ing its guidance on face masks [20]. On the 7th April, the
Centre for Disease Control (CDC) recommended wearing
face masks in public [22]. On 8th April, the WHO announced
that there was no evidence to suggest wearing a face mask
would prevent healthy people from catching Covid-19 [29].
These kinds of conflicting messages have led to a great deal
of uncertainty.
5 GUIDELINES & RECOMMENDATIONS
Organisations should have contingency plans to support
home working. This ought to include a suite of technologies
that people are given to ensure that their online activities
are carried out securely. Moreover, these ought to be tested
to ensure that employee privacy is preserved. If people are
under pressure to do their jobs, without being given the
necessary tools, they are likely to find a way. Humans are
endlessly innovative in overcoming obstacles and finding a
way to fulfil their commitments.
Here, we present some guidelines and recommendations
regarding security and privacy for private companies, public
organisations and third-sector organisations in response to
the COVID-19 crisis.
5.1 Sustaining the Secure
Organisations should build on their existing information
security and privacy policies by updating these to ensure
they cover unforeseen problems that have now been exposed
by the pandemic lockdown. Issues to be addressed include
video-conferencing and other tools used to support remote
working, teaching or learning from home and the manage-
ment of signing up to applications or websites.
As it is unlikely that staff will fully read and/or understand
the complete policy, organisations should consider creating a
summary of topics that are specifically relevant to the crisis,
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Figure 5: CORONAVIRUS Stay at Home Protect the
NHS Save Lives
Figure 6: Hand Washing vs. Face Masks
with clear advice, and communicate these in a straightfor-
ward way to their staff, with a link to full details within the
applicable policy.
Based on existing research evidence [31], this could be an
effective way of positively influencing staff behaviour to re-
duce security and privacy problems. Similarly, governments
should build on existing guidance by updating this for their
citizens in terms of information security and privacy, and
communicate the main points in a straightforward manner,
with a link to full details. This will alleviate the problems
highlighted in Section 4.2.2.
5.2 Securing the Insecure
Technology Choice: A co-ordinated approach is needed to
analyse and identify the security and privacy strengths and
weaknesses of video-conferencing and other networked tools
(Section 3), and then to publicise the results with straight-
forward guidance to the general public. This is important
to ensure that users use appropriately secure and privacy-
protecting tools and appropriate tool configurations to pro-
tect their information and preserve their privacy.
WiFi: Consider the use of WiFi. Employees should avoid
the use of public WiFi and make sure that home WiFi is
as secure as possible. Attempts should be made to ensure
that routers in the home are password-protected and, where
possible, those working at home should have as up to date
a router as possible. More recent routers, those less than 5
years old, have more built-in security.
Authentication: Those working from home should fol-
low the advice given by their organisations’ IT services and
use approved (and supported) software. It is good practice
to make use of strong passwords and ensure that, where
possible, multi-factor authentication is utilised. Make sure
there is up to date antivirus software in place and install
updates and patches as soon as they become available, as
long as these are from official sources.
Access Control: In addition, every attempt should be
made to separate work and personal devices and people
should be advised not to share work technologies with fam-
ily members.
In this co-ordinated approach, there may be roles for third-
sector organisations that specialise in information security
and/or privacy and for government security organisations. It
is important that the communication of the guidance be clear
and available from a single access point. This will allow users
to more easily locate, assimilate and apply the guidance [67].
5.3 Alleviating the Worrying
5.3.1 Privacy & Human Rights.
The development of a wide variety of contact-tracing apps
(Section 4.1) could be useful in terms of promoting competi-
tion and innovation to improve the quality of app support
for combatting the virus. However, given the crisis at this
time, collaboration can be more beneficial than competition
[8], as the latter:
(1) may be too slow to improve quality on time, as the
virus does not follow the competition’s timetable,
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(2) may prioritise the app’s ‘virus-combat effectiveness’ at
the cost of information security, privacy and other consider-
ations, and
(3) may be too slow in terms of take-up for people to
choose the best possible app because of information overload
(too many apps on offer with too many choice attributes to
consider) [38] and choice inertia (people are slow or reluctant
to change to another product even if it is better) [3].
Therefore, in crisis times such as this, instead a collabora-
tive multidisciplinary approach should be followed to ensure
that effectiveness, security, privacy, usability and other con-
siderations are taking into account.
In addition, iterative design and testing is necessary to
ensure quality improves during development, but also after
deployment to continually improve the app [13, 24].
A single app per country or coalition of countries (for
example, the EU) would provide a single access point. This
will allow users to more easily locate, assimilate and apply
the information. An example of a pan-European approach
to develop a GDPR-compliant app is currently in operation
under the name Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity
Tracing (PEPP-PT2020)1.
More generally, from the perspective of privacy, several
evaluation criteria have been identified that specifically contact-
tracing apps should meet [17]. These are: • limiting the per-
sonal data gathered by the authority;
• protecting the anonymity of every user;
• not revealing to the authority the identity of users who
are at risk; preventing the system can be used by users to
learn who is infected or at risk, even in their social circle;
• preventing users from learning any personal information
about other users;
• preventing external parties from exploiting the system
to track users or infer whether they are infected;
• putting in place additional measures to protect the per-
sonal data of infected and at risk users
• providing support for people to verify that the system
does what it says.
Contact-tracing apps will vary in the extent to which they
support privacy. For example, the Pan-European Privacy-
Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) app [57] aims to
preserve privacy and maintain security, but does not explic-
itly address all these criteria.
5.3.2 Communication.
Regarding communication weaknesses (Section 4.2.2), any
measures and the communication of these measures need
first to be thought through thoroughly and they should be
1https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Corona-Tracking-Apps-
mit-PEPP-PT-Entscheidend-ist-fuer-uns-dass-der-Datenschutz-
gewaehrleistet-wird-4700336.html
based on the nationally and/or internationally available rele-
vant expertise. Therefore, the recommendation is to make
good use of academic and other experts in relation to the
content and communication of measures.
In addition, the communication and measures should be
thoroughly evaluated before they are released within the
time constraints. This is because poor communication can
have adverse consequences in terms of potentially length-
ening the pandemic, as our analysis of government com-
munication shows. It should be possible to do the required
evaluation relatively quickly by drafting in academic and
other experts to help combat the crisis. Whether their contri-
bution is made mandatory or not, many of them will be keen
to help contribute to solving the crisis, in any case, when
given the opportunity.
6 CONCLUSION
These are unprecedented times and the move to home work-
ing has been implemented in a necessarily speedy way. How-
ever, as the initial implementation settles and people begin
to get used to the “new norm”, there is a need to reflect on
the efficacy and viability of thereof. The stresses of need-
ing to participate in organisational activities mean that the
ability to engage could lead to usual security measures and
non-compliance with organisational policies. Cyber crimi-
nals will likely exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the
home working environment.
As has been illustrated by our narratives, the vulnerabili-
ties can result from the lack of specific policies, consequent
“needs must work-arounds”, insecure hardware and/or non-
robust software applications. These, combined with an in-
crease in malicious attacks, mean that the home working
environment is replete with potential digital threats.
We do not seek to criticise anyone for the technologies
they make use of in an emergency. We wrote this paper to
highlight the difficulties employees faced and the security
risks quarantined citizens unwittingly exposed themselves
to. We suggest a better way forward as the main contribution
of this paper.
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